Hazar alfaqeih Personal Statement Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Hazar alfaqeih - Personal Statement Example I taught Mathematics in an elementary school in my country and had the opportunity for practical application of the methods and guidelines that I learnt from the best Doctorate holder in the college. She inspired me to do master’s degree in statistics and then go for the Doctorate in the same subject. Her style of counseling was excellent, she visualized the perspectives about this subject well, and I am now convinced that I would achieve my career goals by specializing in statistics. The subject of statistics is now my passion. Before my interaction with her, I had the notion that Statistics was a dull subject, full of never-ending calculations. Her style of dealing with the finer aspect of the subject changed the attitude of the students and we began to love statistics, and eagerly looked forward to her classes. Take me as the practical example, how a teacher can influence the thinking process of a student. The twin objectives of my life will be served, firstly to expand my knowledge on the subject and secondly to equip myself academically to impart knowledge, as my career goal is to teach in a University and be a Visiting Lecturer in business houses. With proper interaction from the lecturers and professors in your University and the fellow-students, I will further improve my communication skills. For an aspiring Visiting Lecturer in statistics, I would often need to explain technical matters and the latest statistical methods to make them understand business and the economy from the point of view of this subject. Business tools and strategies are continuously on the change with rapid progress that is taking place in technology and application of statistical methods. Your University is the best to get proficiency in statistics program, as graduates from your University hold responsible positions in top-ranked business establishments. They are constantly on the upward spiral in their careers, and are making

Cultural Gap Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Cultural Gap - Essay Example Raised in a Christian family. My parents lived by the church doctrines. Something to do with the relationship was out of the question, especially at our tender age. Going to LGBT meeting was a big decision I made. Many of the online discussions about the meeting seemed appealing. The encouragement I received from online friends gave me hope; I had to find out what I did not know. I focused on finding self-fulfillment. At first, I was nervous and at the same time excited. I never knew what was in place for me. It was like going to another planet. It seemed something intimidating and a scary one to walk into a room and be sincere over something I could barely admit. The truth looked fantastic, but from hiding in it, it ended up being the scariest thing. As I joined college, I sent an email to the LGBT coordinator concerning where and when the meeting could occur. Unfortunately, at that time, I failed to turn up for the meeting due to some reasons I could not avoid. On this occasion, I was confident and focused on attending it, though felt scary than before. On the initial day of the meeting, I walked to the building and found the room number. My nerves took held of me. How I wished, I knew it was okay to be who I am and to feel the way I felt. I had spent years denying who I was. It is so ridiculous to feel so at the place where I should have called home. I had no idea of having people around me who cared and who could understand me. I took a friend to the meeting with me. I was too nervous to go alone. The environment inside was nothing I expected. At first, I felt it would not work. In some few minutes, the room was with young men who were open, smart, fantastic, and very welcoming. The room was so welcoming and open. Afer introducing myself, I talked about how I felt. I had to accept myself and come out. With time, I am glad to have learnt a lot about LGBT people and myself. I wished I had involved myself

Concept Of Risk Management In Navy Management Essay

Concept Of Risk Management In Navy Management Essay The concept of risk management has been around the Navy since its inception. During the drawdown of the 1990s, the risk management concept was formalized into the Operational Risk Management (ORM) program. This structured approach was initiated to mitigate the risks associated with such a massive reorganization. Risk is inherent in all tasks, training, missions, operations, and in personal activities no matter how routine. The most common cause of task degradation or mission failure is human error, specifically the inability to consistently manage risk. ORM reduces or offsets risks by systematically identifying hazards and assessing and controlling the associated risks allowing decisions to be made that weigh risks against mission or task benefits. As professionals, Navy personnel are responsible for managing risk in all tasks while leaders at all levels are responsible for ensuring proper procedures are in place and that appropriate resources are available for their personnel to perform assigned tasks. The Navy vision is to develop an environment in which every officer, enlisted, or civilian person is trained and motivated to personally manage risk in everything they do This includes on- and off-duty evolutions in peacetime and during conflict, thereby enabling successful completion of any task and mission. à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦Integrate Safety and Risk Management into all on and off-duty evolutions to maximize mission readiness and to establish DON as an organization with world class safety where no mishap is accepted as the cost of doing businessà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦Establish a risk management training continuum to ensure all DON personnel receive targeted [ORM] training and that all formal professional training courses are infused with examples of how effective risk management improves both safety and mission readiness. DON Objectives for FY 2008 and Beyond (9 Oct 07) Benefits of ORM Reduction of operational loss. Lower compliance/auditing costs. Early detection of unlawful activities. Reduced exposure to future risks. Table of Contents I. Statement of the Issue or Problem (1 page) II. Significance of the Issue / Problem Why the issue / problem is important to aviation human factors (1 page) III. Review of Relevant Research (include references to at least five aviation human factors journal articles and / or aviation human factors texts, such as those found in ebrary at the ERAU Hunt Library (5 pages) IV. Summary of Major Findings and Conclusions (1 page) V. Recommendations for future research to address the issue / problem (1 page) *********************What is ORM? The term Operational Risk Management (ORM) is defined as a continual cyclic process which includes risk assessment, risk decision making, and implementation of risk controls, which results in acceptance, mitigation, or avoidance of risk. ORM is the oversight of operational risk, including the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes and systems; human factors; or external events. +++++++++++++++++++++How The ORM process assists you in making smart and informed decisions. Actually, you apply ORM every day. At times, you may not even be aware of it as you carry out a task or mission. An example of this is as simple as crossing the street; you look both ways because you were taught this at a young age. However, today you dont even look at this as risk management, but something that you know is the right thing to do before crossing the street. Every Sailor has a role to play in managing risk during a commands task or mission, and every Sailor is vital to the success of the Navy team. Purpose The ORM process minimizes risks to acceptable levels, commensurate with task or mission accomplishment. Correct application of the ORM process will reduce losses and associated costs resulting in more efficient use of resources. Zero risk is not the intent of ORM. Goal The Goal of ORM is to develop an environment in which every officer, enlisted, or civilian person is trained and motivated to personally manage risk in everything they do; to manage risk and move forward to accomplish the mission while safeguarding our people and infrastructure. Risk management is a continuous process that is integral from the strategic level of planning through the tactical level and execution. It is a tool to help improve mission readiness and mission accomplishment. The figure shows the three levels of ORM defined primarily by time. There is no definitive separating line between the three levels (in-depth, deliberate, and time critical) represented by the transition in color flowing from one level to another as you approach the task or event. It is important to know we have resources to tap into. At each level of the planning process, hazards and associated risks are identified and appropriate controls are developed and implemented. These controls become resources upon which you can draw for the next level of planning and ultimately for execution. The ORM process is a systematic, continuous, and repeatable process that consists of five basic steps. Identify hazards Assess hazards Make risk decisions Implement controls Supervise (and watch for changes) The first two steps comprise the risk assessment portion of ORM and provide enhanced awareness and understanding of a given situation. This awareness builds confidence and allows for timely, efficient, and effective protective measures. The remaining three steps are the essential follow-through actions to either eliminate the hazard or mitigate the risks. Risk Assessment Matrix ORM Matrix Card ORM incorporates the following four principles: Accept Risk When Benefits Outweigh the Cost Accept No Unnecessary Risk Anticipate and Manage Risk by Planning Make Risk Decisions at the Right Level Accept Risk When Benefits Outweigh the Cost The process of weighing risks against the benefits and value of the mission or task helps to maximize success. Balancing costs and benefits can be a subjective process. Therefore, personnel with knowledge and experience of the mission or task must be engaged when making risk decisions. The goal of ORM is not to eliminate risk but to manage the risk so that the mission or task both on- and off-duty can be successful. The bottom line is, if no benefit can be achieved then do not take the risk. Accept No Unnecessary Risk Operational Naval Instruction (OPNAVINST) 3500.39 (series) states: If all detectable hazards have not been identified, then unnecessary risks are being accepted. Additionally, an unnecessary risk is any that, if taken, will not contribute meaningfully to mission or task accomplishment or will needlessly jeopardize personnel or material. The risk management process identifies hazards that might otherwise go unidentified and provides tools to reduce or offset risk. The acceptance of risk does not equate to the imprudent willingness to gamble. Take only risks that are necessary to accomplish the mission or task. Anticipate and Manage Risk by Planning Integrating risk management into planning as early as possible provides the greatest opportunity to make well-informed risk decisions and implement effective risk controls. This enhances the overall effectiveness of ORM and often reduces costs for your organization and yourself when off duty. Make Risk Decisions at the Right Level Anyone can make a risk decision. However, the appropriate decision maker is the individual who can eliminate or minimize the hazard, implement controls to reduce the risk, or accept the risk. Leaders at all levels must ensure that their personnel know how much risk they can accept and when to elevate the decision to a higher level. Ensuring that risk decisions are made at the appropriate level will establish clear accountability. Therefore, those accountable for the mission must be included in the risk management process. If the commander, leader, or individual responsible for executing the mission or task determines that the controls available to them will not reduce risk to an acceptable level, they must elevate the risk decisions to the next level in the chain of command. 3 LEVELS ========================================== The risk management process is applied on three levels: in-depth, deliberate, and time critical. The basic factor that differentiates each level is time; that is the amount of time available to dedicate to the preparation and planning of missions or tasks. Time Critical Risk Management (TCRM) Personnel know ORM. They develop plans and brief the crew on task procedures. However, we often fail to execute the plans as briefed. We do not manage change as it occurs, and those changes affect the original plans. Usually, the personnel injured during a task are those who were not involved in the original planning. Recent studies of the ORM process have found that personnel have a firm grasp of the In-Depth and Deliberate levels of ORM. Unfortunately, personnel fail to execute Time Critical Risk Management (TCRM) during tasks as events change. You are accustomed to the 5-step process during In-Depth and Deliberate ORM processes; however, realistically it is difficult to execute the 5-step process during the time critical level effectively. Therefore, we are introducing a new tool for the execution of TCRM. This tool will help you improve communication, handle change, and manage risk to ensure mission success. We are NOT eliminating the 5-step process rather, the five steps are incorporated into this new, easy-to-use tool. This model consists of various graphic representations for situational awareness (target), stacked blocks (resources), a swooping arrow (a return to good SA) and a four letter box mnemonic (ABCD) that will help you improve communication, handle change, and manage risk to ensure mission or task success. Its called the ABCD model. The ABCD mnemonic in the model is not a replacement for the 5-step ORM process or a different process of risk management, but it is the practical application of the 5-step process in a time-critical environment. Off-duty mishaps are extremely detrimental to the Navys operational capability. Because we are part of the Navy team 24/7, the actions we take off-duty can affect the readiness and operational capability of our commands mission or task, therefore affecting the Navy as a whole. Thus, we must constantly be aware of all risks involved in our everyday off-duty activities. ORM applies off-duty the same as on-duty. By consistently using the A-B-C-D loop in our individual activities, we can reduce the number of off-duty mishaps; thereby improving the Navys readiness and operational capabilities. These fewer mishaps will also allow individuals to meet personal and professional challenges now and in the future. Benefits of ORM Reduction of operational loss. Lower compliance/auditing costs. Early detection of unlawful activities. Reduced exposure to future risks. *****************Glossary of Terms ABCD The mneomic for the four actions of Time Critical Risk Management (TCRM). A-Assess the situation, B-Balance your resources, C-Communicate to others, D-Do and Debrief the event. Acceptable Risk The portion of identified risk that is allowed to persist during the mission or task. Additive Condition Refers to all items that compete for an individual or crews attention during the execution of a mission or task. Examples include; equipment malfunctions, change in weather, multiple players, unpredictable information, and change to the mission. Additive conditions may increase task loading or uncertainty and lead to distraction or channelized focus. Command (unit or organizational) ORM Integration Integrating ORM into the command relates to reviewing procedures, instructions, and processes; identifying hazards; and creating controls associated with those hazards Command ORM Manager Designated unit level individual, qualified in accordance with OPNAVINST 1500.75(series), who is responsible for implementing risk management principles, concepts, and policy within the unit. Consequential Error An error which leads to undesired consequences to property, personnel, or mission (e.g., mishap, personal injury, mission failure, etc.). Controls Actions taken or measures put in place to eliminate a hazard or reduce the associated identified risk. Some type of controls include engineering controls, administrative controls, and physical controls. Crew Factors Refers to human factors which affect the capabilities of the individual, crew, or team and can increase the potential for errors. This includes such things as attitudes, personalities, level of training, experience, fatigue, and physiological factors. CRM Crew Resource Management Exposure An expression that considers the frequency, length of time, and percentage of people or assests subjected to a hazard. Exposure is a component of risk, but not directly used to assign a level of risk. Rather, it is a consideration in determining probability and severity. Hazard Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; degradation of mission capability or impact to mission accomplishment; or damage to the environment. (Synonymous with the term threat.) Operational Analysis A chronological or sequential list of the major events or elements in a mission or task. This is the complete picture of what is expected to happen and assures all elements of a mission or task are evaluated for all potential hazards OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations OPORD Operation Order OPS Operations ORM Operational Risk Management Operational Risk Management A process that assists organizations and individuals in making informed risk decisions in order to reduce or offset risk; thereby increasing operational effectiveness and the probability of mission success. It is a systematic, cyclical process of identifying hazards and assessing and controlling the associated risks. The process is applicable across the spectrum of operations and tasks, both on and off duty. ORM Assistant Designated unit level individual who is a subject matter expert (SME) on ORM principles and concepts, qualified in accordance with OPNAVINST 1500.75(series), and supports the command ORM manager in implementing risk management within the unit. PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis PPE Personal Protective Equipment PO Petty Officer PQS Personal Qualification Standard Preliminary Hazard Analysis A means to create an initial list of hazards that may exist in an operation, task, or mission. This builds on the operational analysis and entails listing hazards and associated causes. Probability A measure of the likelihood that a potential consequence will occur. RAC Risk Assessment Code Residual Risk Risk remaining after controls have been identified and selected. Resource Something that can be used to develop controls and includes time, money, people or equipment. With respect to Time Critical Risk Management (TCRM), a resource is something used to prevent errors, speed up decision making, or improve team coordination. Resources are typically developed as controls at the in-depth or deliberate levels of risk management. They are broadly grouped into the following categories: Policies, procedures and routines; checklists; automation; briefings and external resources; and knowledge, skills and techniques. Risk An expression of possible loss, adverse outcome, or negative consequences; such as injury or illness in terms of probability and severity. Risk Assessment A structured process to identify and assess hazards. An expression of potential harm, described in terms of severity, probability, and exposure to hazards. Accomplished in the first two steps of the ORM process. Risk Assessment Code An expression of the risk associated with a hazard that combines its severity and probability into a single Arabic numeral which can be used to help determine hazard abatement priorities. This is typically accomplished through the use of a risk assessment matrix. The basic RACs are: 1-Critical, 2-Serious, 3-Moderate, 4-Minor, and 5-Negligible. Risk Decision The decision to accept or not accept the risk(s) associated with an action; made by the commander, leader, or individual responsible for performing that action. Root cause Any basic underlying cause that was not in turn a result of more important underlying causes. Describes the depth in the causal chain where an intervention could reasonably be implemented to change performance and prevent an undesirable outcome. The analysis of a hazard may identify multiple causes; however applying controls to the root cause is ultimately more effective that merely addressing an intermediate cause. Severity An assessment of the potential consequence intensity that can occur as a result of exposure to a hazard and is defined by the degree of injury, illness, property damage, loss of asset (time, money, personnel) or mission or task impairing factors. When analyzing risk, it is based on the worst credible outcome. Situational Awareness (SA) Refers to the degree of accuracy by which ones perception of the current environment mirrors reality Task Loading The number of tasks to complete, given a set period of time. Higher task loading increases the potential for error. Task loading can be reduced by either reducing the number of tasks or taking more time. TCRM Time Critical Risk Management TFOM Training Figure of Merit Threat See hazard. With respect to ORM, threat and hazard are considered synomynous. TORIS Training and Operational Readiness Information Services TRACS Total Risk Assessment and Control System Unacceptable Risk The risk when measured versus the benefit or value of the mission or task that cannot be tolerated and must be eliminated or controled. What If Tool A means of thinking about what may go wrong and stating it as a question beginning with the phraseWhat if? This method is most useful for personnel who are actually involved in the operation being analyzed and adds insight to some of the more significant hazards identified with the preliminary hazard analysis (PHA). WIT What IF tool

The Themes of Faulkners Absalom! Absalom! Essay -- Absalom! Absalom!

The Themes of Faulkner's Absalom! Absalom! The theme of Absalom! Absalom! is the connectedness of humanity and the power of illusion vs. truth. In order to really translate these entities to the reader Faulkner uses the form of stream-of-consciousness. In this style of metaphorical writing one thing can lead you to all things, and vice versa. This is the form of the novel. One can compare this work to a gothic novel, to a Greek tragedy, to an entire metaphor for the situation of the South in itself, but the content is mainly giving us a metaphor for the connectedness of humans. He gives us truth wrapped in subjective interpretation, based on half-baked memories and cut up pieces of time and space. Faulkner's use of confusion, narration shifts, and generally chaotic style give us a form that makes us work for control of it. Unlike Hemmingway, who pounds you with inane generalities and dialogue, Faulkner suspends us from the text, and then slowly builds again drawing us in again from a different angle, a different aspect of the same story. As we traverse the sporadic and courageous landscape of the human mind we are dragged into the maybes, perhaps, and could have beens that are sometimes more true than the stark, strange reality that hits us straight in the face. The passage on the bottom of page 210 reads, â€Å"Yes. Maybe we are both Father.   Maybe nothing ever happens once and is finished.   Maybe happen is never once but like ripples maybe on water after the pebble sinks, the ripples moving on, spreading, the pool attached by a narrow umbilical water-cord to the next pool which the first pool feeds, has fed, did feed, let this second pool contain a different temperature of water, a different molecularity of having se... ...t the truth would even mean, considering who was left to even care. This is the ebb and flow of the mind, the heart, the will; the movement of consciousness as it becomes memory, desperately trying to piece together a long forgotten truth that has now become a burning mystery set in the very being of existence.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Faulkner uses these tactics of piecemealing, shuffling, circular arrangement, narrator shifts, and stream-of-consciousness to put the reader in the shoes of the Everyhuman, the tie that bind us to each other, to all things, one fading as another rises, rising and fading together always already. He shows us truth is an elusive chimera, never able to be pinned down for showcasing in all its realness. Only the fragments of the broken mirror of truth can be pieced together through memory and will, and perhaps with courage and a bit of shrewdness.

International Law Essay

An international legal order is not just a matter of prudence; it is a requirement that derives from a rather essential moral obligation, the (limited) obligation to help ensure that all persons have admittance to institutions that protect their most essential human rights (DJ Harris, 1991). Though, offered international legal order gives a prominent role to states need not consequence in overly conservative conclusions[1]. International law whose major elements must be justice rather than politics based in two senses: (1) justice, understood mainly as respect for basic human rights, serves as the basic vantage point from which to assess the existing international legal system and to originate proposals for improving it; and (2) a recognition of the moral compulsion to help ensure that all persons have access to institutions of justice understood as institutions that care for their basic human rights—supplies the chief moral cause for trying to develop an international legal system directed by the ideal of justice. International law can be stated in the form of four basic theses. (1) Justice has to to be a primary goal of the international legal system, where the major content of justice is supplied by an outset of basic human rights. (2) Legality, both for states (understood as long-term institutional structures) and governments (understood as collections of agents inhabiting key institutional roles) requires a convincing effort to please at least a minimal threshold standard of protection of basic human rights by means that value those same rights. (3) Rights of autonomy are constrained by the claims of legitimacy, and therefore eventually by justice. The right to pull out, understood as the unilateral right or nonconsensual entitlement to seek autonomous statehood by groups currently within the jurisdiction of a state, is a corrective right only, a right that a group comes to have by virtue of importunate and serious violations of the human rights of its members, or of rights given on them by intrastate autonomy agreements, or by virtue of infringement of the rights of legitimate states (as when one state unfairly annexes another). Hence there is no right to separate from a legitimate state with a legitimate government, unless secession is by mutual agreement or constitutional provision. (4) Groups can have legitimate interests in diverse forms of self-determination short of secession without having a right to pull out, and the international legal order ought to give active support for democracy (Katzenstein, Peter, 1996). Recognizing that we ought to use our domestic political resources to hold a system of international law intended to ensure that all persons’ rights are respected is quite companionable with a clear recognition that government has no independent moral status and no independent legitimate interests, but is to be considered strictly as a fiduciary, and that the state is formed for individuals rather than vice versa (Martin Dixon & Robert McCorquodale, 2003). However, the trick is to understand how popular sovereignty in a system of states can be made well-suited with state policy in support of a more just international legal order. The means to seeing how this compatibility can be attained is to realize that popular sovereignty does not mean unlimited sovereignty[2]. Instead, popular sovereignty means simply that the people of a state are the definitive source of political authority within the state and that government is primarily to function as their agent. The degree of the peoples’ sovereignty—including the limits placed on it by international law and the moral limits on how it might be exercised that are imposed by the natural duty of justice—are another matter. According to moderate cosmopolitanism, we do have moral compulsions beyond our own borders, but these are seen as being well-suited with giving special priority to the requirements and interests of our fellow citizens. The view is cosmopolitan as it distinguishes genuine moral obligations to those outside our own polity, and that for this reason the special precedence given to our own polity cannot be absolute. It is reasonable because it rejects the extreme cosmopolitan position that all of our particular obligations, together with our obligations to our fellow citizens, are severely derivative upon our obligations to humanity at large. The shift from the optional association view to recognition of the justice understood as a restrained cosmopolitanism does not end debates concerning whether and how to use our state’s resources to sustain efforts to achieve moral progress in and through international law; it only makes it probable to engage in them. For one thing, there is the exceptionally difficult issue of how much priority we might give to our own interests and how great the costs are that we should bear in helping to protect the rights of those who are not our fellow citizens (Martin Dixon, 1993). One of the most reflective changes that have occurred in the international legal system since the 1960s is that partaking in the processes that specify the content of human rights has been deeply broadened, as membership of the UN became open to all countries, including former colonies. In contrast, all through most of the history of the international legal system, membership was restricted to a handful of Western states. Perhaps even more significant, the significant growth of transnational, nongovernmental organizations increasingly allows for meaningful participation in the development of specifying norms that is not completely controlled by states[3]. There are two motives to welcome these developments. First, broader participation can be apparent to reduce the risk of parochial biases in moral reasoning concerning which rights are truly human rights and how their content is to be tacit The specification of human rights norms that would consequence from a process of operationalization in which the simply participants were Westerners or representatives of Western states might be quite diverse from one in which a broader sampling of humanity participated. Second, quite excepting the fact that broader participation is, other things being equal, more probable to capture effectively the content of norms that are supposed to apply to all human beings, not just to Western Europeans, subjectively restricted participation impugns the legality of the process of operationalization and thereby threatens to weaken the effectiveness of appeals to human rights in the international legal order as a whole. The first benefit of extensive participation is epistemic, the idea being that a system that features broad participation is more expected to result in an accurate requirement of the content of human rights norms; the subsequent concerns procedural justice and its contribution to professed legitimacy, not the quality of the outcome of the process. By attributing the right to be renowned as a legitimate state to a new political entity, the international legal order signals that it is all set to take its place in the system of states, fulfilling the functions that only states have and enjoying the rights, liberties, privileges, and immunities atypical to states. By uncoupling the legitimate interests that diverse groups can have in self-determination from the independent right to secede, and by extrication self-determination from nationality, the international legal order can and must encourage creative departures from the centralized-state; â€Å"unbundled† autonomy paradigm that fuels secession yet virtually never solves the problems that give rise to it. Limitation of the unilateral right to secede to a corrective right would liberate states to consider intrastate autonomy arrangements without getting on a slippery slope toward their own dissolution[4]. Discontent minorities would be expectant to opt for intrastate sovereignty as an alternative to secession by reassuring them of international monitoring of and support for conformity with autonomy agreements in high-risk cases. Dangerously broad references in international legal documents to an international legal right to autonomy should be replaced by clear statements of the independent right to secede as a remedial right only and by language that uncouples the right to pull out from legitimate interests in autonomy and uncouples self-determination and nationality. International law must support the legitimate interests of national minorities by intensification human rights against discrimination and by encouraging states to search forms of intrastate autonomy, rather than by recognizing a â€Å"right of autonomy of peoples† that legitimizes secession by such groups (Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, 1994). International recognition of a unilateral right to intrastate independence in certain special, rather narrow circumstances. First while international law recognizes a group’s right to secede, it must also distinguish the right of the group to opt for intrastate autonomy if it so chooses. Second, while a group (whether it is a nation or not) qualifies on corrective grounds for a unilateral right to disaffiliate but opts instead for intrastate autonomy, the international legal order must recognize its legal right to independence and play a positive role in negotiations to originate an appropriate intrastate autonomy arrangement and must apply appropriate measures to monitor conformity with it. Third, international law must recognize and support intrastate autonomy for indigenous groups when they are desired to rectify serious injustices suffered by such groups. Fourth and finally, where establishment of an intrastate autonomy establishment for a minority is the only way to avert it from suffering large-scale violations of basic human rights, an intrastate autonomy regime can be imposed upon a state through a proper international legal process (Ruggie, John Gerard, 1993). The international legal community must construct a more ethically defensible and practicable international legal practice regarding involvement for the sake of protecting basic human rights, one that does not need Security Council authorization in every instance (under the current arrangement in which each undying member of the Council has a veto). A new practice of intervention, so far as it pertains to secessionist conflicts, should be shaped by and consistent with the remedial right only approach to an international legal right to unilateral secession. Subject to apt constraints that apply to justified humanitarian interventions usually (proportional force, protection of noncombatants, etc.), states must be allowed under international law to mediate to support groups that are known in international law as having the unilateral right to secede, if other means of restoring the group’s grievances have failed or offer little viewpoint of success in a timely manner[5]. Generally speaking, international law must prohibit states from intervening militarily to support secession by groups that are not renowned under international law as having the independent right to secede and should support legitimate states in their efforts to resist illegal secessions. Exceptions to this overview could include cases where the state has endured in using unlawful means of war to restrain an illegal secession (for example, indiscriminate and/or inconsistent military force or efforts to suppress the secession that amount to genocide). References: DJ Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law Fourth Edition, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1991). J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, â€Å"The State and the Nation: Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations†, International Organization 48, 1 (1994): 107-8. Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Policies. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Martin Dixon & Robert McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law (4th ed., Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press/Blackstone Press, 2003). Martin Dixon , Textbook on International Law, 2nd ed. ( London: Blackstone Press, 1993). Ruggie, John Gerard. â€Å"Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations.† International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 139–174. Foot Notes Slaughter, Anne-Marie, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’, American Journal of International Law 87 (1993). Teson, Fernando, A Philosophy of International Law (Westview, Boulder, CO, 1998). Rubin, Alfred, Ethics and Authority in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997). Scheffler, Samuel, ‘Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism’, Utilitas 11 (1999). Kingsbury, Benedict, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’, European Journal of International Law 9 (1998). [1]   Slaughter, Anne-Marie, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’, 205-39 [2] Kingsbury, Benedict, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’, 599-625. [3] Scheffler, Samuel, ‘Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism’, 255-76. [4] Teson, Fernando, A Philosophy of International Law, 78-79. [5] Rubin, Alfred, Ethics and Authority in International Law, 122.

Appshop Case Analysis

Cover Letter The Appshop Inc case is based on the evaluation of the various alternatives available for the company while charging its client for execution of a project. Mr. Clark, Director, Central Region Appshop Inc had to make a decision on either accepting any one of the prices suggested by the client or participate in the bidding process. The case involves using Monte Carlo Simulation and Triangle Distribution to figure out the best possible option for Appshop Inc. Executive Summary Appshop Inc was a privately held, independent full-service Oracle consulting, applications and outsourcing company with revenues of $ 25 million. Mr. Eric Clark, Director, Central Region Appshop Inc was responsible for growing the company’s client base, selling additional services and supporting the existing client base. Mr. Clark had recently concluded a successful implementation of Oracle financial for one of its clients Dallas office. The client pleased with Appshop’s performance had requested Mr. Clark to implement the similar application across the company’s (client) offices across the globe and come out with a project cost for this implementation. Mr. Clark with his team of consultants outlined the scope, plan and the timeline for implementation of the project for the client. Appshop would have to put in 1000 hours of work per month for the next 24 months, which would cost Appshop $ 140 per hour. Based on these findings, Mr. Clark proposed $ 175,000 per month for 24 months for implementing the entire project. However, the client requested Appshop to lower the prices and gave two alternative prices. Appshop could either accept $ 155,000 per month for 24 months or $ 125,000 per month for 24 months along with a bonus of $1. 5 million post satisfying certain criteria, the probability of which was 0. 7. In case, Appshop did not accept the two alternate prices suggested by the client, then the client would go for a bidding process. The company winning the bid would receive the revenue bid amount and a gain share reward. The reward would be based on the saving that the company would realize upon implementation of the project. Based on previous work undertaken for the client, Appshop estimated the savings for the client to be a maximum of $12. 8 million, a minimum of $ 3. 2 million and a most likely saving of $ 5. 6 million. Appshop for implementing the project, proposed to quote $ 150,000 for the bidding. The Appshop team estimated a 45 per cent chance of winning the bid at this price. Post Monte Carlo Simulation with Triangle distribution, the revenue realized was $ 3. 8 million as shown in Appendix 1. On analyzing the three alternatives available to Appshop Inc, the decision should be based on giving equal importance to the maximum revenue that can be realized and the risk associated with it. The first alternative would generate revenue of $3,543,765 and all of which is risk free, however this alternative gives the least revenue. The second alternative would generate revenue of $ 3,751,919. 5; however, there is a risk of 0. 7 per cent associated with winning the bonus. The third alternative, the bidding process, generates the highest revenue of $3. 8 million; but, there is only a 45 per cent chance of winning the bid. Since the difference in revenue realized by exploring alternative two and three is miniscule, the decision now will be made on the alternative, which has a higher prob ability of occurring. The risk associated with alternative two is lower than the risk associated with alternative three, therefore, we would recommend going ahead with the second alternative. Analysis and Execution of the case Appshop Inc had calculated that for implementation of the project, they would have to put in 1000 hours of work per month for the next 24 months. This would cost Appshop $ 140 per hour. Therefore, Appshop proposed $ 175,000 per month for 24 months. However, the client rejected this offer and proposed two alternatives. Alternative 1 was $ 155,000 per month for 24 months and Alternative 2 was $125,000 per month for the next 24 months along with a bonus component of $1. 5 million. However, the bonus was based on meeting the multiple benchmarks set across various parameters. Appshop estimated the probability of receiving the bonus to be 0. 7. Analysis of Alternatives Proposed By the Client To make comparisons, we need to calculate the present value of each of the amount that Appshop would receive from the client. The present value annuity factor would be = (1/r – 1/r (1+r) ^24), the discount rate is . 5 per cent/month. Thus, the annuity factor calculated comes out to be 22. 563. Analyzing Alternative 1: $ 155,000 per month for 24 months With this amount, the client would pay = 155,000 x 22. 863 = $3,543,765. This amount is far below than the one proposed by Appshop of $3,948,525($175,000 x 22. 563). Analyzing Alternative 2: $ 125,000 per month for 24 months plus a $1. 5 million bonus. The probability of Appshop receiving this bonus based on their calculations was 0. 7. With this amount, the client would pay = 125,000 x 22. 563 = $2,820,375. To calculate the bonus, we need to firstly find the present value of $1. 5 million and multiply that with the probability of winning. The present value of $ 1. 5 million is = $1,330,778. 50. We now multiply this amount by 0. 7, the probability factor = $931, 5 44. 50 Therefore, the total amount that Appshop would receive from exploring this alternative two would be = 2,820,375+ 9 31,544. 950 = $ 3,751,919. 95. This amount is also lower than the one proposed by Appshop of $ 3,948,525 ($175,000 x 22. 563). We now explore alternate 3. Analysis of the Bidding Alternatives Analyzing Alternative 3: The company winning the bid would receive the revenue bid a mount and a gain share reward based. The reward would be based on the saving that the company would realize upon implementation of the project. The table below shows the saving and the bonus associated with it. Savings |Winning bidders share of saving | |< $4 million |0 | |$4 million upto $6 million|20 percent of excess above $6 million | |$4 million upto $6 million|$400,000 plus 40 percent of excess above $6 million | |> $8 million |$1. 2 million plus 60 percent of excess above $8 million| Based on previous work undertaken for the client, Appshop estimated the savings for the client to be a maximum of $12. million, a minimum of $ 3. 2 million and a most likely saving of $ 5. 6 million. Appshop for implementing the project, proposed to quote $ 150,000 for the bidding. The Appshop team estimated a 45 per cent chance of winning the bid at this price. We would use the Monte Carlo Simulation with Triangle Distribution [see Appendices] to find the revenue that Appshop would receive post bidding at the $ 150,000. The total revenue that Appshop would receive on winning the bid would be a total of the revenue bid and the share of the saving. Appendix 2 & 4 show the histogram for total cost and gain share based on the Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation also gives us a value of $ 3. 8 million, which is what Appshop would receive if it participates in the bidding process (ref appendix 1). This amount of $ 3. 8 million is generated by taking into consideration the probability of winning and the various profit sharing model devised by the client. Conclusion As we compare the present value of the revenues realized by alternative one, two and three, it is clear that alternative three is the best option in terms of revenue. Option one gives present value revenue of $3,543,765, which is the lowest as compared to the other two alternatives. Alternative two with revenue of $$ 3,751,919. 95 an alternative three with revenue of $ 3. 8 million have nearly the same value. However, there is only a 45 per cent probability of realizing alternative three (bidding process), whereas in alternative two, the probability of receiving the bonus is 0. 7. Therefore, considering the revenue and the risk associated with it, alternative 2 is the best choice for Appshop Inc to go ahead with.